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ABSTRACT
THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS' ROLE IN RECONSTRUCTION
OF KUWAIT: A CASE STUDY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
FUTURE INTEPNATI)NAL MISSIONS
by
Brian L. Baker
Submitted to the Departments of Civil Engineering and Political Science on
January 17, 1992 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degrees of Masters of Science in Civil Engineering and Political Science.
The political universý is changing in the wake of a united
Europe, the Soviet Unions' collapse and the assertion of US
military dominance in Kuwait. We have moved from a bipolar to a
unipolar universe, with the US alone now occupying the central
position.
How long this political configuration will persist is hard
to predict: perhaps ten years, maybe less. The integration of
Europe will likely create the largest and most influential
marketplace on earth. And the birth of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) will create a monumental reconstruction
market for years to come. These circumstances, when coupled with
the Corps of Engineers' construction expertise and its recent
experience in Kuwait as program manager for reconstruction, puts
the US in a position to take the lead in international
reconstruction efforts.
This thesis is a call for employing the US Army Corps of
Engineers in post cold-war Europe and the "Soviet Union" as the US
agent for reconstruction. The Corps could act as program manager
and facilitator of innovative construction management programs.
My central thought is that these management programs, having been
developed in a relatively low risk environment at home and tested
abroad could be transferred directly to the private sector for
reconstruction/ disaster relief efforts in Eastern Europe and the
CIS. As a result, our technology and construction contractor
bases would be strengthened, bolstering our nation's
competitiveness in this burgeoning global market sector.
Unless wisely invested, the inheritance from our cold-war
victory and subsequent Gulf War victory will soon be exhausted.
We should see ourselves as stewards of the planet, whose task is
to sustain ourselves an help rebuild our neighbors,
simultaneously. The US has a distinct responsibility and the
Corps a unique aptitude to assume the lead in reconstruction/
disaster relief worldwide. This opportunity will not last
forever, we must therefore, act now and form a national strategy
to utilize the Corps as our reconstruction agent in this new
international marketplace.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
For the past decade, many observers have predicted that the
bipolar rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union
would gradually be supplanted by a multipolar political universe.
The rise of a united Europe and a reunited Germany and the
concurrent emergence of Japan as an economic giant suggested that
there would soon be several superpowers, and none would
predominate.
But with Soviet communism's collapse and the assertion of US
military dominance in Kuwait, these predictions have been thrown
into question. We have moved from a bipolar to a unipolar
universe, with the US alone now occupying the central position.
Few imagined that the American century would be reborn so soon
after its declared demise.
The reasons are several. Prospective challengers are now
disabled or preoccupied with internal transformations. Germany
finds its hands unexpectedly full with bringing its eastern third
up to speed. Scandal-ridden Japan wavers in indecision - an
economic superpower without a mission of its own in world
politics.' The Soviet Union's virtual surrender on all fronts
leaves the US without any substantial opposition on the world
'Mark Sommer, "US Geopolitical Windfall", The Christian Science Monitor, 22
OCT 1991.
stage.
How long this political configuration will persist is hard
to predict: perhaps 10 years, maybe less. Germany's reintegration
will be completed by then and its perceived weight in the world
more substantial. Though still far from complete, the integration
of Europe will likely have already created the largest and most
influential marketplace on earth. Instability and the
proliferation of nuclear concerns stemming from the disintegration
of the Soviet Union2 will be among the most important challenges
posed to Americans in the 1990s.
This thesis is a call for employing the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers in post cold-war Europe and the "Soviet Union" as the
U.S. agent for reconstruction.3 The Corps could act as program
manager and facilitator of innovative construction management
programs. My central thought is that these management programs,
having been developed in a relatively low risk environment at
military installations at home and tested abroad; particularly in
the Middle East--most recently Kuwait, could be transferred
directly to the private sector for reconstruction/ disaster relief
efforts in Eastern Europe and the CIS. As a result, our
technology and construction contractor bases would be
2The term "Soviet" will no longer apply after the first of the year (1992)
The former USSR is slated to become a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
3The task of reconstructing war torn societies must address three areas: 1)
political institutions; 2) economy/physical infrastructure; 3) and civil society,
the latter being the most complex. It is the second area (physical
infrastructure) that I will spend the bulk of this paper addressing. One must,
however, address the entire spectrum if one expects to be successful.
strengthened, bolstering our Nation's competitiveness in this
burgeoning global market sector. A second but equally important
role for the Corps might be in the nuclear disarmament arena,
whereby the Corps would use its vast organizational and management
skills to oversee such a program.
The US Army Corps of Engineers is an organization with
worldwiae mega-project4 management experience. It has a well
developed organizational structure, standing operating procedures
for construction management and diplomatic duties in performing
military construction for friendly foreign nations.
The U.S. has a distinct responsibility and the Corps a
unique aptitude to assume the lead in reconstruction/ disaster
relief worldwide. As this Nation's Engineer, the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers is capable of applying its vast engineering
management expertise towards finding feasible solutions to
international infrastructure crises. This is not just wishful
thinking, however. With over a century of experience, the Corps
has forged strong relationships with society and industry. In
addition, the Corps is a stable, government organization capable
of bearing significant financial and operating risk.
Engineering skills and tools are abundant within the Corps
at its thirteen (13) engineering divisions and thirty-nine (39)
4As mankind approaches the 21st Century, international mega-projects are
likely to become increasingly common in the engineering and construction
industry. A mega project could be defined as a high impact technically complex
project which requires careful advanced planning, lasts several years, has a
significant impact on the public and industry, employs thousands of people and
typically costs over $1 billion--value alone is insufficient.
districts worldwide, and at its four (4) central laboratories.
The synergy of using all of these to facilitate the development of
new and better construction management programs geared towai.d th3
international arena, is clear. In fact, the Corps is already an
active player in this process.
The Corps has a well documented track record in the
international construction arena. Therefore, its performance on
international mega-projects is relevant to understanding its
capability to undertake a task of this magnitude.
The Corps' reconstruction and environmental cleanup efforts
in Kuwait are a serious, massive enterprise. The Corps of
engineers is highly skilled in emergency mop-ups. The Corps'
disaster assistance to Kuwait is similar to that which the Corps
has done in the states (i.e., Alaskan Oil Spill, Hurricane Hugo,
Loma Pareta earthquake, etc.)5 In addition to these recent
reconstruction/ disaster relief efforts, the Corps has completed
over $18 billion in construction throughout the Middle East over
the past 25 years. The scale and scope of these efforts are
massive.6 Its because of this and the recentness of our Kuwaiti
efforts that I examine the Corps' role in the Middle East at great
length.
5Extract Summary of remarks by BG Witherspoon at the Federal Liaison Network
Luncheon, April 16, 1991.
6MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM VALUE(SMILLION)
SAUDI ARABIA 16,000 (completed)
EGYPT 891 (ongoing)
KUWAIT 717
-DESERT STORM 300
-KUWAIT RECOVERY 217
-KUWAIT RECONSTRUCTION 200
EUROPE DISTRICT 667
OTHER 255
TOTAL >18,000
Above and beyond these wealth of attributes is the fact that
the Corps is an agent of our government and our national policy.
It has its finger on the pulse of national sentiment and our
policy-makers' desires, along with understanding its greater task
of maintaining the Nation's trust. The Corps is central in
coordinating the engineering solutions to our problems and
presenting them to our Nation. Hopefully, our nation's civilian
leadership recognizes the correlation between this and the
proliferation of opportunities to employ the Corps in the
international arena. Ironically, the very same organization
within the Corps (Transatlantic Division) has recently been
assigned the Middle East and European geographical areas of
responsibility--adding to the importance of reviewing this
organization's structure.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has countless years of
experience in military and civil works construction. This thesis
will review the position of the Corps of Engineers in regard to
increasing its role in reconstruction and emergency operations in
the international arena. To accomplish this, this paper will:
First, review the history of the Corps of Engineers, its
organizational structure and foreign mandate as well as a vision
of its future role in the international arena. Second, review its
historical experience in the Middle East and attempt to ascertain
why the Corps is particularly suited for this new role. Third,
analyze the historic role the U.S., particularly the military, has
played in post-war reconstruction and emergency operations in the
international arena. Fourth, review Kuwait as a case study,
honing in on the Corps' role in reconstruction: post Gulf War; and
attempt to draw from this, lessons learned--to be applied
elsewhere in the international arena. Finally, a conclusion will
be offered regarding the Corps' future potential as the U.S. agent
for reconstruction in the Eastern European and Soviet markets.
Unless wisely invested, the inheritance from our cold-war
victory and subsequent Gulf War victory will soon be exhausted and
we will find ourselves in hock as never before. We should see
ourselves as stewards of the planet, whose task is to sustain
ourselves and help rebuild our neighbors, simultaneously. The
U.S. is in a position now, to take the lead in a planned
reconstruction effort in Eastern Europe & the CIS and the Corps of
Engineers has the where-with-all to execute a plan of this
magnitude. This opportunity will not last forever, we must
therefore, act now and form a national strategy to utilize the
Corps as our reconstruction agent in this new international
marketplace.
Chapter 2
THE UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
2.1 BACKGROUND: The purpose of this chapter is to offer a brief
historic review of the civil works accomplishments of the Corps of
Engineers (hereafter referred to as the Corps or USACE), its
organization, mission and foreign mandate as well as a vision of
its future role in the international arena.
The United States Army Corps of Engineers is both a civil
and a military engineering and construction agency. It's work
force of more than 40,000 civilians and 1,000 military personnel
makes it the single largest engineering and construction
organization in the world.
"The Corps is broadly responsible for military construction,
military engineering and supply, and military engineering training
programs. It is a major Army command and, as such is the direct
responsibility of the Secretary of the Army. As a civilian
construction agency, the Corps is responsible for the design,
construction, operation and maintenance of navigation and flood
control improvements and related works.`7
The commander of the Corps is a Lieutenant General, called
the "Chief of Engineers", who also holds an army staff position.
His command consists of thirteen Divisions and thirty-nine
Engineer Districts, worldwide and four central laboratories.
7Arthur Maass, Muddy Waters: The Army Engineers & The Nations Rivers,
Cambridge, MA, Harvard Univ. Press, 1951, p. 21.
The Corps' civil mission currently includes many forms of
construction work, environmental protection and cleanup, and
development work affecting program/ project management and water
and wetlands. In its military role, the Corps of Engineers
provides military facility construction support to the US Army and
Air Force at home and abroad, as well as to friendly foreign
governments when directed by congress.8 It is via this avenue
that the Corps could lead the reconstruction efforts in Eastern
Europe. The Corps is also responsible for Army facilities
engineering, property maintenance and management of more than 24
million acres of real estate. In addition, the Chief of Engineers
is responsible for the combat readiness of all military engineer
soldiers, as well as for doctrinal development and emergency
policy and plans. The Corps of Engineers also manages the Army's
nuclear power program.
The history of the Corps of Engineers include this
organization's direct effort in the planning, construction, and
management of many of our nation's resources. In fact, this
organization has been directly involved with and responsible for
many of the nation's roadways, developing the nation's intercostal
waterways, construction of lighthouses along the nation's shore
line, flood control activities throughout the country,
hydroelectric generation, and the construction of buildings and
monuments within our nation as well as on foreign soil.
"Richard J. Polo, "Innovation in the US Army Corps of Engineers: A Case
Study of Ft. Drum", (Masters Thesis, MIT, May 1989), p. 34.
2.2 HISTORY: The Corps of Engineers has an important place in
the nation's history. The Corps predates the establishment of the
United States. From its inception in 1775, with the appointment
of Richard Greely as the first Chief Engineer to the President,
the Corps of Engineers has maintained a prominent role in
construction and other non-military related infrastructure. With
but a brief nineteen year period from 1783 to 1802, during which
time the Corps wa. disbanded, this work effort has been unbroken.
On March 16, 1802, the present Corps of Engineers was
formally established. Along with this formal creation, the U.S.
Military Academy at West Point 9 was established for use as the
sole school to train and supply engineer officers to the Corps of
Engineers. This program for engineer specific training :•-mained
in effect until 1866, at which time the Corps lost formal control
over that school. Since 1866, the Corps has continued to solicit
scientific and engineering educations of its officers through this
and other schools throughout the nation.
From its inception the Corps has been the predominant
constructor of civil works in the Nation. It was the engineering
department of the government which planned and executed the
internal improvements initiated in the 1820's, which included
navigation improvements on the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers,
construction of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal and completion of
the Cumberland Road. Rivers and harbors work has generally fallen
under the corps since 1852 and flood control since 1936.
9West Point was the only technical engineering school in the country
[predating MIT] until Rensselaer Polytechnic was founded in 1825 and it was
administered by the Corps of Engineers until 1866.
In 1941, the Corps of Engineers became the in-house
construction agency for the U.S. A.rmy. At this time, Corps of
Engineers officers oversaw the construction of military bases
throughout the world in support of the Allied Nation's ongoing war
effort. This year also marked the start of construction of the
Pentagon building, located in Washington, D.C., which ultimately
took two years to complete at a cost of $60 million.
Other Corps construction efforts during and after this
period included construction of the Alaska Highway commencing in
1942, implementing the new construction program for VA Hospitals
throughout the U.S. (a program commencing in 1946), the post-war
reconstruction program in Greece from 1946-49, implementing
portions of the Nuclear Power program beginning in 1952, support
to NASA for the space program commencing in 1961, and implementing
the nation's dam inspection program of 1977, to name but few.
Above and beyond these wealth of attributes is the fact that
the Corps is an agent of our government and our national policy.
It has its finger on the pulse of national sentiment and our
policy-makers' desires--who not only control appointment of its
top officials, but its organizational structure as well.
2.3 ORGANIZATION: At all echelons, the organizational structure
within the Corps of Engineers is established by the dictates of
Congress and the Secretary of the Army. At the top level, the
Corps' organizational structure is designed to insure a clear
communication line between the Chief of Engineers (appointed by
Congress with recommendation from the President), the Secretary of
the Army (answerable to the President), and Congress. Based on
this relationship, the Chief of Engineer's responsibilities for
reporting become split between the Executive and the Legislative
branches of government. Subordinate to the Chief of Engineers is
the entire Corps operation, including that for civil works.
Directly below the Chief of Engineers reside eight
directorates (figure 2.3.1). These directorates orchestrate the
entire work effort of the Corps' civil and military works programs
as well as ancillary services regarding basic support to the Corps
of Engineers as an organization.
The relationships of these directorates, boards, subordinate
offices, and civil works executing offices are presented
diagrammatically on the following page.
FIGURE 2.3.1
Corps of Engineers Organizational Chart
SOURCE: Mark Johnson, "Future Infrastructure Responsibilities: An Analysis of a
Government Organization's Strategy", (Masters Thesis, MIT,1991), p. 44.
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The internal organization of the Corps of Engrineers includes
thirteen division offices"' and thirty-nine subordinate district
offices(figure 2.3.2). Of the division offices, eleven share in
their responsibilities between civil works and military works.
Div
AT
For
Act
Hundreds of ongoing civil works projects.
FIGURE 2.3.2
Corps' Organization at Division and District Level
SOURCE: Johnson, p. 48.
'"Division offices are the equivalent of separate operating companies in
private engineering and construction firms.
The Corps is a proponent of centralized planning and
decentralized execution. Its organization reflects this
philosophy. It generally places a great amount of construction
management responsibility and contract administration authority at
the lowest levels (at resident engineer or area engineer offices
within engineer districts) while maintaining responsibility and
authority for engineering and program management at district and
division levels. It is through this vast organizational structure
that the Corps accomplishes its mission.
2.4 MISSION: The Corps' civil works mission can best be
described by the products and services provided by it, which
include: 1) construction management, 2) engineering and design,
3) laboratory support, 4) real estate development and
management, 5) regulatory functions, and 6) emergency operations.
Additionally, the Corps has various mobilization and wartime
missions that support not only U.S. military operations at home
and abroad, but also secure and maintain the nation's
infrastructure.
1) Construction Management, under either military or civil
works funding, is provided within the dictates of the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and its Army and Corps supplements.
The primary mechanism for bringing completed construction to the
customer is the fixed price contract secured through competitive,
sealed bidding. All Corps construction is performed under
contract - the Corps has no organic civilian construction assets.
2) Engineering and design is performed either by in-house
engineers or through negotiated, open-end design contracts with
regional and local architect-engineer (AE) firms.
3) Laboratory services are accomplished at all of the Corps
divisions and at the four Corps labs: the US Army Waterways
Experiment Station (WES); the US Army Construction Engineering
Research Laboratory (CERL); the Cold Regions Research &
Engineering Laboratory (CRREL); and the Engineer Topographic
Laboratories (ETL), as well as by private agencies employed by
contractors during construction.
4) Real estate development and management are functions
which have been developed through vertical integration along the
Corps Value Chain and deal with Army or Defense Department lands.
5) Corps regulatory functions pertain to the nation's
waterways and its environmental mandate and are also performed at
all Corps divisions.
6) Emergency operations are also provided by the Corps'
divisions to assist the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
with damage assessments and emergency construction management
during national and international emergencies and disasters.!!
The Corps does substantial work in its international role--
most recently with providing shelter for the Kurds in Northern
Iraq and camps for the Haitians in Cuba. Congress often charges
the Corps with these "foreign mandates".
2.5 FOREIGN MANDATE: In its worldwide mission, the Corps provides
11Alex Dornstauder, "Hazardous Waste Remediation & the US Army Corps of
Engineers: Facilitating Technological Innovation Through Construction
Management", (Masters Thesis, MIT, 1991), p. 74.
engineering, design, procurement, and construction services in two
magor arenas:
--Work for foreign defense forces
--Work for other U.S. government agencies operating in the
region.
The Corps provides military construction services to foreign
defense forces that request these services from the U.S.
government. The work comes under the auspices of the Department
of Defense Security Assistance Program, which relates to the sale
of military equipment and weapon systems. However, the Corps'
services to "others" as is the case here, also come under this
same program. The work is accomplished under foreign military
sales case procedures, and is financed by either the host
government or through the U.S. military assistance program.
2.5.a FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ACT: The Corps gets its foreign
mandate from Congress who determines whether the US becomes
involved in a particular program or not through the Foreign
Military Sales Act (FMSA). The FMSA became Public Law 90-629 on
October 22, 1968 and has been revised six times from 1971 through
1976. Section 2769 sets policy for foreign military construction
sales.12
Its primary provisions are that the President may sell
design and construction services to any eligible foreign country
if that country agrees (1) to pay the full amount of a contract
which assures the United States Government against any loss on the
12US Code, Title 22 Section 2769.
contract and (2) to make funds available in such amounts and at
such times as required to meet the payments under the contract,
and any damages and costs of cancellation of the contract in
advance of when they are due. The President delegated his
functions under this law to the Secretary of Defense in a 1977
Executive Order. The FMSA does not spell out the extent and
explicit terms of Defense Department involvement in providing
design and construction services to foreign governments, this must
be done separately for major civil works contracts as was done in
Saudi Arabia, via the Engineer Assistance Agreement.
2.5.b ENGINEER ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT: The Engineer Assistance
Agreement (EAA) was a country-to-country pact concluded on May 24,
1965 between the US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and the Saudi
Minister of Foreign Affairs.3  It was sponsored by the US State
Department. The EAA called for the United States to provide
advice and assistance in the design and construction of certain
military facilities for The Ministry of Defense & Aviation (MODA),
funded by Saudi Arabia, as well as providing a training program
for Saudi engineers.14 The two countries agreed that the US Army
Corps of Engineers would be the agency to perform the assistance
defined under the agreement. Ultimately, the agreement was
extended five times and USACE performed most of its Saudi Arabian
13Prince Sultan Bin Abdulaziz al Saud, King Faisal's brother, who headed the
Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA) in the 1960's, turned to the Corps of
Engineers to rebuild and modernize much of the military infrastructure of the
Saudi Arabian Armed Forces.
14USACE, Information Paper, "U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Involvement in
Saudi Arabia", April 1, 1988, p. 1.
program, including construction of King Khalid Military City
(KKMC), under the EAA's guidelines. 15 It Became the basic
agreement under which the Corps of Engineers functioned in Saudi
Arabia and now stands as the blueprint for US reconstruction
efforts in Kuwait.
The EAA warrants more than just passing attention because
some of its provisions were far-reaching and farsighted. They had
a great impact on USACE's management philosophy for KKMC and,
later, became sticking points in relations between Saudi Arabia
and the Corps.
Some of the important statements regarding construction
management made in the EAA include:
1. The Corps shall be entirely responsible for the administra.ion
of all construction contracts awarded under the terms of this
agreement.
2. ...the contractor shall receive instruction only by the contracting
officer.
3. The Corps shall have the right to issue change orders to construction
_:ontracts as required by field conditions, technical and
engineering considerations, construction problems encountered,...
4. Change orders that would change the authorized scope of the facilities
being constructed will be issued only with concurrence of the Saudi
government.
In essence, the EAA made USACE an agent of the Saudi Arabian
government, acting for and on its behalf. 6  This arrangement
"
1 The crowning achievement under the EAA was the Corps' construction of the
$7 billion King Khalid Military City--the largest and most challenging single
military construction project in USACE history.
'
6This is precisely how the US could do business in Eastern Europe & the
Commonwealth of Independent States--acting as the US agent for reconstruction.
gave USACE full control of design and construction management
efforts with Saudi officials acting as Program Manager.
It is worth noting that clearly defining the role of the
program manager, the construction manager and the owner in advance
is a prerequisite of effective mega-project management. This is
particularly true in the international arena where the various
actors are from different regions on the globe and may have
extremely different, sometimes incompatible practices. The Corps
plans for these factors when managing international contractors.
2.5.c MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTORS: The challenge of
doing construction in the international arena is compounded by
special considerations for managing international contractors.
They fall in two general areas: (1) standards and
specifications; and (2) cultural considerations. The Corps
discovered that skills required for international mega-project
management include the ability to anticipate and plan for
differences in contractor cultures and knowledge.
Some foreign contractors simply don't understand US
specifications and measurements and try not to follow them. A
Corps District Engineer remarked, "There's a propensity among
international contractors to build things the way they want to
build them without regard to the plans and specifications." He
then related a story about a Filipino contractor that built a
sewage treatment plant. It disregarded the plans and
specifications and attempted to install the contract's electrical
system as it would in the Philippines. In turn, this required
more Corps supervision and considerable rework to correct.>
Some of the associated problems with International mega-
projects can be avoided altogether by integrating international
contracting factors into project planning. A related aspect of
planning for international contracting is preparing to accommodate
the cultural differences of a foreign contractor work force. The
important point of this discussion from the construction manager's
perspective is that some of these cultural differences can be
planned for to reduce their disruptive impacts. The Corps accepts
these issues as part of its foreign mandate and considers them in
the planning stages of all its missions - worldwide.
2.6 SUMMARY: From this brief review it is clear that the history
of the Corps of Engineers in infrastructure related missions is
rich and detailed and continues strong into this day. Missions
assigned to the Corps of Engineers have been assigned due to both
historic relevance as well as on an as-needed basis; although, the
"as-needed" basis has often extended into long term commitments
for the Corps of Engineers. To this day, Congress continues to
assign domestic & international missions to the Corps as it
recognizes the need for these particular and unique missions to be
addressed. This is particularly true today.
The world is changing, primarily as a result of the victory
17
"Phase Out in Saudi Arabia", The Military Engineer, March-April 1989, p.
82.
in the Cold War. In the international arena, the rules of the
game are different. Bipolarity - the fundamental conditions since
World War II - faded with the overall decline of the Soviet Union,
crumbled with the Berlin Wall and expired with the dissolution of
the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union.
The world is changing to one of multiple centers of
military, political and economic power. This multipolarity will
be less predictable, less stable and perhaps a bit uncomfortable
for many while we adjust.
"The end of the Cold War, changes in domestic spending
priorities and the constrained fiscal situation combine to ensure
a real decline in the Army's [Corps] budget over the next several
years. These fundamental changes, both abroad and at home,
require the Army [Corps] to set a new course for the future. As
we do so, it is important that we keep in mind where we are
headed. "18
2.6.a CORPS' FUTURE: As I see it, the Corps has several options:
1) It could continue to focus much of its resources on the
domestic market - building its reputation as "mr clean" in the
environmental arena and rebuilding the infrastructure here at
home. This approach parallels the current debate in Congress to
reinvest the "peace dividend" back into the American Economy.
2) My vision of the future Corps is an organization serving
our nation at home and abroad. This vision reflects a significant
18Gen. Gordon Sullivan, "Army imperative in peacetime: Keep the edge", Army
Times, January 6, 1991, p. 47.
shift in thinking and direction. The Corps of today and tomorrow
is not a smaller version of the old Corps, constrained by the Cold
War. This is a different Corps - a Corps that balances continuity
with fundamental change.
The Soviet Union is facing "a very large set of problems
that will take 10 to 20 years to work out. Of primary concern to
the United States are unanswered questions about the fate of the
Soviet central government and control of the Soviet military"
particularly, the nuclear arsenal." Fear of a civil war faded
as the central Soviet government weakened and the republics
declared independence. But in its place grew fear of wars between
the republics. I'm not sure we in the West totally understand the
ethnic differences among the republics. Things could flare up.
It could be scary. When the Ukraine voted itself independent from
the Soviet Union Dec. 1, it became the world's third-largest
nuclear power.20
The disintegrating Soviet Union is the most immediate
example of where the U.S. military might be called on for non-
combat purposes. The military's role should be subtle, similar to
the role it now plays in Central and South America-digging wells,
building roads and training the militaries of host nations. Such
work is not done by brigades and divisions, but by the Corps of
Engineers.
19Bud Hay, "World Changes Turn US Military Focus Inward", Army Times,
january 6, 1992, p. 28.
20Ibid.
The United States and its military could serve as a
stabilizing force around the world - the cap on the bottle. The
strategy of deterrence could yield to one of reassurance.
Congress recently earmarked $400 million of the 1992 defense
budget for helping the Soviets ensure the security of the nuclear
weapons. It is uncertain how the money is to be spent. Spending
defense money to help an old enemy and using the military to
perform humanitarian missions and as peace-keepers represent major
changes in how the military is perceived and how it will perceive
itself.21
As a Major Army Command, the Army Corps of Engineers could
act as the conduit for US aid to the CIS. The Corps could act as
an arm of the US Government for construction & reconstruction to
include the monumental task of dismantling some of their nuclear
arsenal. This most certainly will carry a large price tag and as
such will involve a multinational coalition of donor countries.
In order to manage this international undertaking, the Corps must
sell itself on its merits rather than merely acting on behalf of
the US Government as its agent for reconstruction.
The knowledge of the Corps of Engineer's past relations with
international construction/ reconstruction efforts is necessary to
effectively project what roll the Corps of Engineers will play in
the not-too-distant future.
21William Matthews, "World Changes Turn U.S. Military Focus Inward", Army
Times, January 6, 1992, p. 47.
Case studies regarding the past activities of organizations
are routinely conducted and reviewed as a means of providing an
opportunity to learn from the lessons they uncover. Based on the
findings of these case studies, that organization is then given an
opportunity to improve its performance in similar, future
settings. Thus, for an organization to better negotiate needed
changes to its strategic planning and operations, that
organization should look to its past.
The Corps has a rich and colorful history in the
international construction arena but has not been without its
troubles in pursuing its mandate. A review of the Corps historic
involvement in the Middle East (ch 3) may help to understand its
past role, and help facilitate a strategic plan for its new
international role. A look at the US's historic role in
reconstruction of war torn societies (ch 4) together with the
Corps' recent efforts in Kuwait (ch 5) might shed some light on
this new role as well.
Chapter 3
THE CORPS' HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST
3.1 BACKGROUND: The United States Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE), did its first work in the region during the closing days
of World War II at Dhahran Air Base, Saudi Arabia, but the program
did not reach monumental proportions until the 1970s. The Corps'
organization has varied in both scale & scope over the years.
First, called the Corps' Middle East District (1951-58), then its
Mediterranean (1952-76) and Middle East (1976-86) Divisions, and
its Middle East/ Africa Projects Office (MEAPO) (1976-91), managed
a design and construction program that totals over $18 billion.
That organization is presently termed the Transatlantic Division.
3.2 USACE TRANSATLANTIC DIVISION (TAD): The Transatlantic
Division serves as the United States Army Corps of Engineers'
design and construction agent for the Middle East, Africa and
Europe. TAD currently stands as the Corps' largest international
construction arm. The scale and scope of its operations in the
region are quite substantial.
3.2.a SCALE/ SCOPE: TAD has a substantial geographic area of
responsibility and a sizable program budget. Until February 25,
1991, TAD had been known as the Middle East/Africa Projects Office
(MEAPO) .
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SOURCE: USACE Comnmanders Briefing, dtd. August 26, 199..
Within the Middle East, TAD provides its services in Egypt,
Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia--where the bulk of the Corps' work has
been completed. Work done in Saudi Arabia historically has been
r
r
r
on a reimbursable basis, with the Saudi government paying for all
design and construction. This is not always the case, however.
In Egypt, the work is funded through dollar credits provided by
the United States as a result of the Camp David Peace Accords.
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An appreciation for the scale of these efforts can be obtained
from the figures below:
MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM VALUE($MILLION)
SAUDI ARABIA ** 16,000
EGYPT * 891
KUWAIT 717
-DESERT STORM 300
-KUWAIT RECOVERY 217
-KUWAIT RECONSTRUCTION 200
EUROPE DISTRICT 667
OTHER 255
-----------------------------------------
TOTAL >18,000
* total expenditures for FY 90-92
** total expenditures for entire S.A. program (to date),
1965-90
FIGURE 3.2.2
TAD SCALE
SOURCE: USACE Commanders Briefing, August 26, 1991.
A regional program of this scale and scope requires a
substantial organizational structure to administer it.
3.2.b ORGANIZATION: The Transatlantic Division has more than 300
employees in its headquarters in Winchester, Virginia. Reporting
to TAD are: the Europe District, headquartered in Frankfort,
Germany; the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office in Kuwait City; and
the Saudi Ordinance Program Division in Riyadh. Among the Area
22Fact Sheet, USACE Transatlantic Division, untitled, undated, pp.1-3.
and Residential offices are the Egypt Area Office in Cairo;23
the Tangier Resident Office in Morocco; the Bahrain Resident
Office; the MEAPO-Southwest Asia Office in Riyadh and Dhahran,
Saudi Arabia - in support of Operation Desert Shield/ Storm. A
diagrammatical representation of TAD's organization can be found
at figure 3.2.3.
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FIGURE 3.2.3
TAD ORGANIZATION
SOURCE: USACE Commanders Briefing, dtd. August 26, 1991.
23I have been assigned as Assistant Resident Engineer to the Egypt Area
Office in Cairo and will report February 18, 1992 for a period of 18 months.
The Corps has recently upgraded TADs status to a division
and put a general officer in charge, signifying the value placed
on the region and the importance of its mission there. It is
interesting to note that it is this very division which is
responsible for Eastern Europe as well. The Transatlantic
Division, which is currently involved with reconstruction efforts
in Kuwait, could embody a reconstruction theme in its mission--one
which could encompass new opportunities in Eastern Europe as well
as the Middle East. The collective mission of these varied
offices is broad, allowing room for their respective individual
missions to be tailored to the geographical area and specific
needs of that country.
3.2.c MISSION: The Transatlantic Division's mission is to
accomplish planning, programming, design, construction management,
and related procurement for the acquisition of facilities and
infrastructure to support the following areas of responsibility:
* WARTIME CONTINGENCY PLANNING WITHIN UNITED STATES CENTRAL
COMMAND AND UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OF
RESPONSIBILITY.
* CONSTRUCTION AGENT FOR US GOVERNMENT AGENCIES UNDER THE
"SUPPORT FOR OTHERS" PROGRAM
* CONSTRUCTION AGENT FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SPONSORED
CONSTRUCTION UNDER FOREIGN MILITARY SALES CASE WITHIN ASSIGNED AREA
OF RESPONSIBILITY.
* DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONSTRUCTION AGENT FOR THE MIDDLE
EAST, EUROPE AND DESIGNATED COUNTRIES IN AFRICA.
The Egypt area office in Cairo is the Department of
Defense's construction agent for Egypt and currently has the
largest ongoing construction program within the Transatlantic
Division, surpassing that of Europe, other N. African countries
and the Middle East.
3.3 EGYPT: The U.S. Army Corps on Engineers has been involved in
engineering and construction activities in Egypt for a number of
years. It is presently the site for the corps largest ongoing
international construction effort (approx. $1 billion).
The Egypt mission is assigned to the Corps' Transatlantic
Division (TAD). The project management, design, an contracting
are performed in Winchester, VA. The construction area office
staff centered in Cairo manages the construction through four
resident offices - in Alexandria, Cairo Central Air Base, Cairo
East Air Base, and Abu Shwayer Air Base (PV III).
3.3.a BACKGROUND: During World War II, a substantial number of
U.S. Army troops moved into Cairo while a number of facilities
were constructed there by the Corps.
In 1979, President Sadat of Egypt offered to allow the
United States "in event of need" the use of the Ras Bana military
base facilities. Congress authorized a multi-million dollar
construction program to upgrade the facilities to meet U.S.
requirements. Design was completed by 1983 and construction was
to start in 1984. However, the political and public activities
were terminated in 1985 and the offer to use these facilities
withdrawn.
Following the Camp David Peace Accords, Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) to Egypt increased considerably. With the
introduction of American weapons systems into Egyptian military
forces came the requirement to upgrade existing facilities and
build new facilities to support these systems. The Middle East
Division (MED), now the Transatlantic Division, initiated design
and construction management assistance as part of the Peace
Pharaoh program in 1979.
The initial work consisted primarily of mechanical and
electrical designs and equipment procurement, with
selected/advisory construction management assistance in subsequent
programs. The facilities, primarily flight line and operation
type, have been in support of weapons systems (i.e, F-4E, F-16, E-
2C, C-130, etc.) primarily for the Egyptian Air Force (EAF), with
the U.S. Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) as our customer.
The Corps' involvement in project design and construction
management has increased in recent years due to the awareness by
the Egyptians that their facilities upgrade may require additional
expertise and monitoring not available within the EAF. Most
recently, the amount of national defense funds available to the
EAF has been significantly reduced due to a downswing in the
Egyptian economy. This fact, coupled with Egypt's paramount role
among Arab Nations in the Gulf Wa: has lead to even greater US/
Corps assistance.
3.3.b CURRENT PROGRAMS: A brief overview of major programs is as
follows:
1) Egyptian Air Force (EAF): Most of this program is
administered by the U.S. Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) and is
the largest of the Corps/ Egyptian programs. The current value is
approximately $400 million.
Highlights: 5 main operating air bases, 4 projects were
awarded fiscal year (FY) '89, 2 projects awarded in FY '90, one
project awarded in FY '91.
Eight to ten projects have been identified for the future of
which Peace Vector IV24 will be the largest single project with
an approximate value of $200 million. The recently approved
Apache Helicopter sales case, which includes approximately $20
million for design and construction of new facilities, is part of
the EAF program but is not managed by the US Air Force.
2) Egyptian Land Forces: This is a relatively new program
administered directly by the Corps. The total current program is
approximately $70 million.
Highlights: 4 projects were awarded in FY '89, 8 new
projects have been identified. The initial project was Workshop
101 which is a complete tank/armored vehicle rebuild facility.
Present projects include maintenance facilities for various weapon
systems, i.e., Hawk, Chaparral, etc.
3) Egyptian Navy: This program is a facility modernization
program in support of ship missiles and torpedo acquisitions and
upgrade. Master planning and weapons maintenance is also part of
the modernization. A significant ($42 million) shiplift project
is under construction in Alexandria called "syncrolift". This
24PV IV is the fourth in a series of Egyptian air bases which have been
either constructed or reconstructed by the Corps. This project is near the town
of Janaklies--approx. 2 hours SW of Cairo. The Corps is currently in the process
of letting the contract. Work is scheduled to begin in the spring of 1992, and
last approx. 3 years in duration.
program is managed directly by the Corps with support from the
U.S. Navy. A Harpoon missile storage and maintenance project was
recently completed. The total current program is approximately
$100 million.
Highlights: Syncrolift (marine lift & dry-dock facilities)
projects are under construction; 5-6 new projects have been
identified.
3.3.c SUMMARY: The overall Egyptian program is oriented toward
building a capable defense infrastructure. It never-the-less
requires the same engineering expertise as does other less
military oriented civil works projects--perhaps more. The Corps
fulfills this role. I might also add that it is precisely this
role that is urgently needed in the CIS. These eastern bloc
nations will be in need of some type of infrastructure to insure
that command and control is maintained within their respective
defenses. The central control of these systems may be a thing of
the past. Particularly, if the various republics maintain
sovereignty and push for a more individual/ regional defense
infrastructure.
The former Soviet Unions' Central Military Command may be
broken apart, just who is in control of the military
infrastructure is uncertain. One thing is for certain though,
this debate will be in the forefront of the international
communities' concerns until we are all assured that firm control
of the nuclear arsenal/ military infrastructure has been
reestablished. This very well may entail constructing new
regional facilities or rebuilding older ones.
Although the Egypt Area Office has the largest ongoing
construction program, Saudi Arabia has claims to the largest
completed program, and the largest and most challenging single
military construction project in the Corps' history.25
3.4 SAUDI ARABIA:
3.4.a GENERAL: The Corps primary mission in Saudi Arabia was,
"...to provide engineering and construction management services to
Saudi military agencies, but it was also involved in other than
military programs...".26 The programs involved both military and
civil works construction projects. This was a broader program
than that of Egypt for the simple fact that it did include civil
works construction projects--for purposes other than building a
military infrastructure. After the early projects, Saudi Arabia
entered into a series of formal country to country agreements with
the US to manage projects funded by the Saudis. The most
significant of the country-to-country agreements executed by Saudi
Arabia and the US was the Engineer Assistance Agreement (EAA),
previously discussed in chapter 2. This is a unique case in the
international construction arena where the Saudi's alone
controlled the purse strings.
The EAA called for the United States to provide advice and
assistance in the design and construction of certain military
facilities, as well as providing a training program for Saudi
25Dr. John T. Greenwood, Diplomacy Throuah Construction: The U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers in Saudi Arabia, USACE, Office of History, 1988, p. 1.
26Richard F. Nyrop, Saudi Arabia: A Country Study, 4th ed., Washington,
D.C.: The American University, 1984, p. 270.
engineers.27 This training program could be used as a blueprint
to train engineers.
During the early years of the Saudi Arabian program, this
arrangement worked very well. Saudi Arabia had a large budget but
virtually no qualified engineers and managers and no construction
industry base to work from."2 The Saudis welcomed the Corps of
Engineers' expertise and delegated the necessary authority to
compliment it. However, by 1983 the Saudis had developed a core
group of USACE-trained engineers, the country had a growing
construction materials industry and funds were running short.
This combination of developments lead Saudi officials to increase
pressure for an active role in construction management.
In essence, the EAA made USACE an agent of the Saudi Arabian
government, acting for and on its behalf. This arrangement gave
USACE full control of design and construction management efforts.
Although the EAA guided USACE's organization for and
management of the program, the Foreign Military Sales Act (FMSA)
was the determining factor that allowed the US to become involved.
The Kingdom easily met the FMSA's prerequisites due to Saudi
Arabia's strategic importance in the 1970's and its oil wealth.
This paved the way for Corps of Engineers involvement in the King
27USACE, "Information Paper - U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Involvement in
Saudi Arabia", April 1, 1988, p. 1.
28Although the fiscal situation may be somewhat different in E.Europe, there
is certainly a need to build a construction industry base--a task the Corps is
up to. This could be done on some sort of a credit basis whereby, the US
provides dollar credits to respective countries who in-turn "hire" the Corps to
manage the reconstruction program. The Corps subsequently lets the contracts to
qualified US firms--thereby bolstering the US economy while simultaneously
rebuilding our neighbors.
Khalid Military City (KKMC) project under the terms of the EAA--
the largest and most challenging single military construction
project in USACE history. The Corps' organization was tailored to
meet the demands of this most valued project.29
3.4.b ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING: USACE'S project organization
and staffing metamorphosed during the 12 year duration of the KKMC
project. Though carefully planned initially, the actual
organization and staffing differed significantly from the plan.
This was a result of unforseen recruiting and construction
difficulties as well as changing requirements from the owner. ,n
this section, I examine USACE's organization and staffing
throughout the project and determine its effectiveness.
The rapid growth of the entire Saudi Arabian program, caused
USACE to create a new Division office in 1976--MED. Division
offices are the equivalent of separate operating companies in
private engineering and construction firms. The US Army Engineer
Division, Middle East (MED) was responsible to the Chief of
Engineers to perform all construction projects in the Middle East,
except for those in Israel. Most of the projects were in Saudi
Arabia, but there was also work in Jordan, Oman and Egypt.
The major organizational changes made within the Saudi
Arabian program were:
1. Replacement of the Area Office for KKMC with a dedicated
District Office
29Jeffrey Smith, "Mega-Project Construction Management: The Corps of
Engineers and Bechtel Group in Saudi Arabia", (Masters Thesis, MIT, 1991), pp.
39, 83.
2. Establishment of two new area offices: one to administer
the life/construction support contract and one for the fixed price
contracts.
3. Incorporation of "management assistance" personnel into
USACE offices.
The Middle East Division split the Saudi Arabian District
into two elements, creating the Riyadh District which handled all
construction projects in the Kingdom except KKMC, and the Al Batin
District, which was dedicated solely to the KKMC project.
The creation of a separate district, Al Batin accomplished
the reorganizations primary objective which was to develop an
organization for the King Khalid Military City which could
simultaneously:
(1) Manage design by American Engineering Companies.
(2) Manage massive construction by foreign firms.
(3) Manage procurement and supply of government furnished
equipment.
(4) Accomplish the first three objectives at the lowest
possible cost.
At this early point in project design and planning, the
existing organization with functional area control was
appropriate. Although it had other work in the Kingdom, KKMC was
clearly the top priority for MED. All functional areas within the
division were oriented to planning the KKMC project. The project
manager didn't have to compete for other projects to marshall
support for his own. Therefore, he didn't need full control of
the project planning elements.
4.3.c. King Khalid Military City (KKMC):
4.3.c.1 BACKGROUND: At more than $6 billion, the King
Khalid Military City is the largest military construction project
ever undertaken by the US Army Corps of Engineers. Design work
began in 1976, soon after USACE was directed by the State
Department to perform as the project's design and construction
manager. USACE completed facilities for one armored brigade at
KKMC in 1984. King Fahd inaugurated the city on April 6, 1985 and
USACE completed construction of KKMC in 1987. Saudi Arabia's
Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA) now controls and operates
KKMC with engineers from its General Directorate of Military Works
(GDMW) who were trained by USACE.30
3.4.c.2 PROJECT SCALE: Initially estimated to cost $9
billion, KKMC was the largest construction project ever for the
Corps of Engineers--a complete city and base with facilities and
services for a projected population of over 70,000; an air base; a
hospital; and the Saudi Arabian Army Engineer Center. The project
was so large and complex that the Middle East Division set up the
Al Batin Engineer District in 1977 just to manage the job.
Before construction could start at Al Batin, a port had to
be built at Ras Mish'Ab on the Arabian Gulf for shipments of
30Summarized from information in the article "Phase out in Saudi Arabia,"
The Military Engineer, March-April 1989, pp. 81-84.
building materials and equipment. The facilities were specially
designed for containerized cargo and millions of tons of hulk
cement. The new port and its modern cargo handling facilities
costing $216 million were operational in December 1977.
The crisis in the international oil market in the early 70s
and the consequent drop in revenues forced Saudi leaders to
curtail their development program. The cutbacks affected many
Corps' projects. In 1983 KKMC was scaled down, reducing the
estimated cost to $7 billion. The Corps completed and
subsequently turned over the finished project to MODA in 1986 at a
cost of just over $6 billion."
3.4.c.3 PROJECT SCOPE: Lieutenant General E.R. Heiberg32
concisely summarized the scope of the KKMC undertaking in his
speech to the American Society for Macro-Engineering when he said:
"The challenge was to take the remote desert of Wadi Al Batin with
no infrastructure, forty miles from the nearest highway, extreme
congestion at the nearest port over 100 miles away, no local labor
force, no available construction materials (except aggregate) with
wide price fluctuations and annual price escalations of 20-25%...to
take this environment and create the King Khalid Military City for
a population of (50,000)."33
31USACE, Livina in Saudi Arabia: A Guide for Coros of Engineers Employees,
Winchester, VA: The Middle East Division, Undated, p. 3.
32LTG Heiberg was the Chief of Engineers at the time.
33LTG E.R. Heiberg III, "The Future of Macro-Projects - A Global
Perspective", Address to the American Society for Macro-Engineering. (Washington,
D.C., March 13-14, 1986) p. 3.
KKMC is a self-contained city, completely independent of the
surrounding area. It is octagonally shaped and 2.7 kilometers
across (see MAP 3.4.1). It generates its own electrical power,
has its own water supply and chilled water system and completely
treats and recycles its wastewater for irrigation. KKMC has its
own road network, houses and provides all support facilities for
the city's 6,500 families and has its own hospital, mosque and
education system.
The octagonally-shaped city is divided into north and south
sections. Family housing dominates the north section, while
housing for single men and military facilities dominate the south.
KKMC was assembled from precast concrete elements. Most of the
city's buildings are arranged in low-rise clusters to provide
natural protection from the harsh environment." The design
combines features of traditional Islamic architecture with modern
technology to produce a functional community which is less opulent
than much of the contemporary work done throughout the Kingdom.
Some statistics give the engineer a better feel for the
magnitude of the city:
-2.5 million square meters of buildings (27 million square
feet).
-18 wells, each 1,600 meters (approximately 1 mile) deep to
provide 21 million gallons of water per day, with a peak demand of
30 mgpd.
-A water treatment plant designed to treat 18 mgpd.
34
"Historical Report; Construction & Support Services, KKMC", Morrison-
Knudsen Saudi Arabia Consortium, Baltimore, MD, February 22, 1986.
-A chilled water plant rated at 52,000 tons.
-A sewage treatment plant designed to treat 7 mgpd.
-A 200 mega-watt power plant with 8 gas-turbine
generators.
-The entire city, including training ranges, was built on a
mere 70,000 acres of land.
SOURCE: Smith, p. 94.
MAP 3.4.1
KKMC AREA MAP
3.4.c.4 POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR KKMC: There were many
political considerations for USACE's construction management
approach for King Khalid Military City (KKMC), built in Saudi
Arabia in the late 70's and early 80's, they ranged from
congressional reluctance to employ the American government's civil
works experts in a foreign country, to protests over Saudi
boycotts of Jewish workers and products, to US construction firms'
internatcional lack of price competitiveness in fixed-priced
contracting.
The first issue, at the beginning of the KKMC program,
revolved around a congressional debate of whether to employ the
Corp's of Engineers in such a massive foreign program. USACE had
just completed a four year struggle with the Carter administration
to maintain it's role as the nation's primary civil works manager
when the House appropriations committee criticized USACE in a
annual report for stretching its manpower pool by taking on the
massive Saudi projects, alleging that its domestic capabilities
suffered as a result.
The Chief of Engineers defended USACE involvement in the
S.A. program, espousing that the Saudi work helped to hone and
maintain the agency's construction manacement skills. He stressed
that the Saudi mega-project would produce and train the future
engineers and managers of American military and civil works mega-
projects . 5
By the early 1960s Saudi Arabia had become strategically
35
"Corps Chief Boosts Engineers", Engineer News Record, February 5, 1981,
p. 23.
important to the US. The Saudis were staunchly anticommunist and,
many felt, would provide a bulwark against Russian intrusions into
the Middle East. In addition, they had become the leading
supplier of foreign oil into the US. As some US officials saw it,
the Corps of Engineers could be used to cement ties between the
two nations - at no cost to the US taxpayer.36
The argument expanded and took on additional foreign policy
implications as a result of USACE involvement in engineering and
construction of two fast tracked military airports for the
Israelis during the same period. Not only did this put a further
drain on rapidly shrinking Corps of Engineers manpower resources
but it created a potential diplomatic war over loyalties to
adversaries separated only by the Gulf of Aqaba. Remarkably,
USACE was able to deflect most of the criticism of this
arrangement by having two completely separate divisions control
the projects, each in relative secrecy.3" We could find
ourselves in this very situation if we were to act as the US agent
for reconstruction in Eastern Europe & the Soviet Republics.
The most pressing political consideration for USACE during
construction of KKMC involved its attempts to provide work for US
architect/engineers, supDliers and construction contractors.
Although USACE had a mandate from Saudi Arabia to ensure the
project was open to competitive international bidding, the Corps
36
"A Controversial Role for Army Engineers in Saudi Arabia", US News & World
Report, October 18, 1976, p. 77.
37
"A Construction Job That Will Buy Peace", FORTUNE, July 16, 1979, p. 64.
also felt an obligation to secure work there for American
companies. This notion was reinforced by General Morris, then
Chief of Engineers, who said about the Corps upon his retirement,
"Our job [abroad] is to make a place for US designers and
constructors. "3•
I've identified three tenants stemming from these political
debates which transgress international boundaries and as such, are
very much applicable to the new international markets:
1) International work helps to hone and maintain the Corps'
construction management skills.
2) The Corps of engineers can be used to cement ties
between nations which become strategically important to the US.
3) The Corps provides opportunity for US
architect/engineers, suppliers and construction contractors to
work abroad.
I believe the Corps has applied these tenants to the Middle
East region in general, thereby leveraging itself at home and
abroad, and has had tremendous success. It could do the same in
other international markets as well.
3.5 SUMMARY: The Corps Middle East Program has not been an
unqualified success. USACE has made some costly mistakes over the
course of the past 25 years but has overcome many problem areas.
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The organization has displayed the flexibility needed to manage
crises and correct deficiencies before they become critical. It
has also displayed a willingness to take risks and the skill to
make most of them pay off.
This is evident by virtue of its successful completion of
over $18 billion in construction projects in the region. The
scale and scope of the Corps' present operations in Egypt, coupled
with its past operations in Saudi Arabia are excellent examples of
how an engineering/construction manager combines planning,
organization, staffing and control to complete international
construction projects. The scale of the Corps M.E. program
however, is not indicative of all international programs. Other
circumstances need to be considered for future international
missions.
1) Eastern European nations do not have the capital to
reinvest in their own infrastructure as did Saudi Arabia during
the 70s and 80s.
2) There is currently a downturn in the construction
placement and engineering design placement forecasted by the
Corps' Transatlantic Division (see figures 3.5.1 & 3.5.2). This
is representative of the present US economy. The US alone cannot
afford to finance a reconstruction plan for Eastern Europe, this
necessitates a multinational reconstruction plan - which in turn
requires an organization tailored to the specific needs of that
program and receptive to its multinational constituency - a shoe
the Corps is not currently organized to fit. Similar problems
were abound during reconstruction efforts in Korea after the
Korean war(see 4.2.c, Reconstruction of Korea).
( Excludes Desert Shield/Storm & Kuwait)
FIGURE 3.5.1
TADs FORECASTED CONSTRUCTION PLACEMENT
SOURCE: USACE Command Briefing, Oczober 16, 1991
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FIGURE 3.5.2
TADs ENGINEERING DESIGN PLACEMENT
SOURCE: USACE Command Briefing, August 16, 1991
The Corps ongoing involvement with the reconstruction of
Kuwait and potential future involvement with the rebuilding of
Eastern Europe & the CIS leads me to envision a reconstruction
theme embodied in its mission. If this notion were to come to
fruition, and the Corps did reorganize to meet these needs, then
we may see increased projections for new construction and
reconstruction in the out years (1995 & beyond). A closer look,
analyzing the historic role the US, particularly the military, has
played in post-w-.r reconstruction might shed some light on-- the
Corps' future role in this arena.
Chapter 4
US INVOLVEMENT IN THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF
WAR TORN SOCIETIES
4.1 BACKGROUND: The importance of planning reconstruction can be
understood when one looks at the past. One example is the United
States following the Civil War. The Civil War which ended by the
victory of the North over the South, was not followed as in later
wars by a period of planned reconstruction. When the war ended,
destruction was heavily concentrated in the Southern states where
the need for capital for reconstruction was more than pressing.
However, no plan for the transfer of capital from the North was
ever considered and the economy of the South was left to regain
back its strength on its own. Because of the lack of resources,
the economy of the South remained devastated many years after the
war ended. This attitude seemed to prevail throughout history.
It wasn't until the conclusion of WWII that a reconstruction theme
permeated the international scene in which the US has played a
major role ever since.
4.2 HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS: Historical presidents for
reconstruction abound in the aftermath of World War II.
Ironically, most of the plans that were implemented have been
successful in reviving their respective devastated economies.
Although the Eastern European and Soviet economies have not been
subject to a war per-se, they are never-the-less devastated and in
need of reconstruction. As such, we expect similarities to these
war torn societies.
4.2.a RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE & THE MARSHALL PLAN: The first
hint that a comprehensive reconstruction plan was underway, came
on June 5, 1947, when Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, gave
the commencement address at Harvard University. After painting a
bleak picture of Europe's economic conditions, he announced that
the United States might be prepared to assist the European nations
"in a return to normal economic health" through a program designed
to provide "a cure rather than a mere palliative". But the
initiative of drawing up such a program, "must come from Europe",
and the program itself "should be a joint one, agreed to by a
number, if not all, European nations". This message has been
subsequently credited with the launching of the European Recovery
Program, better known as the Marshall Plan."3
When it emerged from Congress, the Economic Cooperation Act,
which embodied the American expectations from the Marshall Plan,
called for a healthy European economy, independent of outside
assistance by 1952. The act specifically stipulated a recovery
plan based on four specific endeavors:"4
39Immanuel Wexler, The Marshall Plan Revisited, Greenwood Press, Westport,
CT, 1983, p. 54.
40The Marshall Plan: A Retrospective, Westview Press, Boulder, CO., 1984.
First, the reactivation of the most efficient existing
production facilities was viewed as necessary. Second, recipient
countries were to undertake internal financial and monetary
measures to stabilize their currencies, maintain proper exchange
rates and restore confidence in their monetary system. Third, the
countries involved would have to expand multilateral intra
European trade. And finally they would have to bind themselves to
a joint organization that would encourage and review their
development of European economic cooperation. A look at the
evolving European Community (EC) today depicts significant
emphasis still being placed on the latter three of these
endeavors.
The Treaty of Maastrict (named after the provincial Dutch
town that hosted the recent EC summit) is a turning point for
Europe. It practically ensures that a common European currency
will go into circulation before the end of the century. It creates
a European police force, dubbed Europol. It sketches plans for a
future European army. It endows the EC with new responsibilities
in a dozen areas, from culture to telecommunications and consumer
protection.
It was high time. Battered by stiff competition from Japan
and the United States, the EC is on the verge of creating a single
internal market for its 340 million citizens, to go into effect at
the end of next year. But it was tne cataclysmic changes in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union t=ha finally pushed the
Europeans to get their political act together. Those changes left
Western Europe the dominate economic power on the Eurasian
continent, but without the diplomatic or military strength to cope
with the new situation to the east.
The Europeans will act as the "European pillar" of NATC. In
other words, America and Canada will retain their key roles as
partners in the defense of Europe, at the same time as the
Europeans increase responsibility fr lne:r own secur:ty. IR: ed,
the Maastricht accord goes a considerable way toward meeting nhe
traditional American call for a more roblst and politically unrLed
Western Europe. Given the increasingly unstable ana unpredicoable
state of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Washington neeos ail
the effective political support it can get from its traditional
allies. "Maastricht," says a senior U.S. official, "is one of
those very rare things these days - a virtually unmixed blessing."
The creaticn of an organic Europe is still aecades away.
Differences in culture, languagc and national temperament will
hinder progress and may still derai_ the process. Buo the
agreement that recently emerged dramatically increases the
possibility that a real United States of Europe will one day
exist."4
It appears as though the American expectations for the
Marshall Plan may finally come to fruition - with the emergence of
the EC. Expectations for a healthy European economy by 1952 was
perhaps ambitious. However, Europe did recover soon thereafter.
The area of investment which attracted the largest investment in
Western Europe following the war was infrastructure: electricity,
gas and power supply, followed by transport and communications -
due largely to the massive destruction which took place.
Government investments were prioritized to support the immediate
reconstruction of this infrastructure; rebuilding the railways and
transport systems and repairing and modernizing the expansion of
capacity in the "basic" sectors, those which needed to expand
41Scott Sullivan, "Europe Takes a Giant Step", NEWSWEEK, December 23, 1991,
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before the rest of the economy could.42 Historical records show
that Europe required between $15 billion and $20 billion in aid
for reconstruction .
The big difference between then and now, of course, is that
in 1947 the United States was by far the richest nation in the
world, and today it feels comparatively broke. The Marshall Plan
cost more than $100 billion in 1991 dollars. The Bush
administration is suggesting a paltry $600 million to help the
Soviets, and two thirds of that is to aid nuclear disarmament.
Handing out the aid will be a monumental task. It is still
far from clear who is in charge throughout the various republics.
Despite a poor harvest, the Soviets probably have enough food, but
they lack a way to distribute it. Farmers horde their produce,
awaiting price liberation. Roads and railways in the Soviet Union
are in wretched shape. It is entirely possible that the West will
have to create its own distribution network, probably by using the
military. Before the winter is out, the world could be treated to
the strange spectacle of NATO convoys penetrating deep into their
old enemy territories on a mission of mercy.
The case of Japan after World War II was different from that
of Europe in that it was occupied and governed by US forces. It
never-the-less stands as another example of a country that
42Fadi Majdalani, "Financing The Reconstruction of Lebanon", (Masters
Thesis, MIT, 1988), p. 68.
43Immanuel Wexler, The Marshall Plan Revisited, Greenwood Press, Westport,
CT, 1983.
suffered a great amount of destruction but was able to reconstruct
its economy with the help of the United States.
4.2.b THE RECONSTRUCTION OF JAPAN & THE McARTHUR PLAN: After the
end of the war and the occupation of Japan by the US Army, the
Americans soon realized that it would be impossible to administer
directly a nation as complex, and, culturally and linguistically
alien as Japan. This led to the decision to rule through the
Japanese government. For that purpose, the Supreme Commander for
Allied Powers (SCAP) was created. SCAP, headed by General
McArthur who had a staff of 5,983, concentrated its efforts on the
reform of the Japanese economy. However, Japan with a population
of 82,000,000 and stripped of its colonies and the armed forces
that enabled it to exploit an empire, was facing difficulties in
its reconstruction.
The McArthur Plan for Japan had a goal of setting the
Japanese on a pay-as-you-go basis by 1953. The aim of the plan
was also to end the flow of US aid to Japan, which in 1949
totalled $1.3 billion. The plan called for additional spending of
$870 million in the form of raw materials for the different
industries before Japan could pay her own way.4
As these steps were taken, further events sped up the
economic recovery of Japan. On one hand, the US department of the
Army urged that the reparation policies be softened in order to
give Japan a chance of economic revival. It suggested that only
44"Reconstruction of Japan Under Informal Peace: Japan is Being put Back
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primary war industries be removed, but that secondary war
industries be left to produce peace time goods.45
As the measures taken were implemented Japan's economy
started to grow at a faster rate. One must note that Japan's
recovery would not have been possible without the firm foundations
of competence that the Japanese already possessed: universal
literacy, high levels of government efficiency and strong habits
of hard work and cooperation.
The outbreak in 1950 of the Korean War increased the demand
for Japanese products especially by Americans in order to support
their forces in Korea. Trade contracts increased, economic
conditions improved and as soon as 1950, US aid began to shrink
progressively. From 1950 to 1951, it dropped from $440 million to
$320 million. Historical records indicate the US contribution to
be between 3 & 4 billion in aid for reconstruction.
4.2.c THE RECONSTRUCTION OF KOREA: On June 24, 1950, North
Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea.
Less than twenty four hours later the United Nations Council
branded the invasion a breach of peace, called for the withdrawal
of the North Koreans, and asked all nations to help to accomplish
that withdrawal. On June 26, President Truman declared that the
United States would support the United Nations' appeal. The
decision of the US to meet the North Korean aggression and to
45A measure of this type might be appropriate for some of the former Soviet
Republics within the CIS.
assume military responsibility as a United Nations Unified
Command, was quickly followed by a deliberate policy to assist in
the reconstruction of the peninsula when hostilities ceased."
Soon after the UN appointed an Agent General and the
reconstruction mission was set into motion, problems started to
appear. The UN used the US Army as a base for organizing the
relief operations. The United Nations Command (UNC) under the
leadership of General McArthur, was not willing to let a civilian
agency (the UN) operate independently from the military command
especially that the war was still raging on. In July 1951, after
nearly five months of negotiations, the agreement reached
stipulated that the UNC was in charge for the operation of the UN
programs of relief and short term economic aid until the military
operations permit the transfer of this responsibility.
For nearly one year, neither the UN nor the Army [Corps of
Engineers] was solely in charge of the reconstruction efforts.
The program lacked a single governing body initially, and
subsequently showed very little progress during the first two
years of reconstruction. The United Nations personnel consisted
of two groups: first, a group of technical advisors and program
experts that dealt with long range planning; and second, personnel
engaged in relief and short range rehabilitation and
46Gene Lyons, Military Policy and Economic Aid: The Korean Case, 1950-1953,
Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1961.
reconstruction .?
To meet the relief requirements two sources of supplies were
made available to the Corps. On one hand there was the material
procured with US funds originally appropriated to the economic aid
program. These funds were channelled directly to and managed by
the Corps. On the other hand, supplies, equipment and personnel
came from United Nations members other than the United States and
from specialized agencies and private social welfare and health
agencies such as the Red Cross. These pledges were routed through
UN channels and were managed separately.48
The Corps was not organized to operate under a multinational
umbrella - answering to a multitude of donor countries/ agencies.
This is a weakness the Corps must address if it is to operate in
Eastern Europe today as the US agent for reconstruction.
By the time the armistice was signed (July 27, 1953), the
United States had spent $1.2 billion in economic and military aid
to South Korea. At that time, additional nonmilitary
reconstruction was estimated to cost the US approx. $1.5 billion.
A report by the National Security Council recommended that a
bilateral program of defense support and reconstruction over a
period of 4 to 5 years be set up. The estimated cost of such a
program would be $1 billion and the program was to emphasize the
reconstruction of agricultural and industrial production
47The Corps was primarily involved with the short range reconstruction
efforts. It now possesses the expertise to contribute significantly to the long
range planning for reconstruction as well.
48Much like what was done in Kuwait after the Gulf War.
facilities in order to achieve a stable economy outside aid.
Total estimates for the reconstruction of S. Korea vary
significantly. The US alone has spent in excess of $ 5 billion.
The case of Korea highlights a historical example of efforts
under the operational control of the military (Army Corps of
Engineers) and the problems encountered. It is evident that, if
the Corps is to manage reconstruction efforts in the future, then
it must address the shortcomings encountered when working with a
myriad of international organizations - as it did in this case.
4.3 SUMMARY: There are a number of historical precedents for
creating international commissions that work with host governments
in dealing with issues of reconstruction. Shortly after World War
II, the United States joined with other nations in creating the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which
played a major role in the redevelopment of Europe. The U.S./
Chinese Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction played a similar
role in the development of rural Taiwan. While no post-war
situation is like another, these experiences point to the utility
of and need for creating international professional technical
bodies that can play a role in the planning process during a
period of reconstruction. While the creation of an International
Commission for Rural Reconstruction in the Commonwealth of
Independent States could await the formation of a new government,
"...there are obvious advantages in having such a Commission in
place when large-scale reorganization is under way.""49
The reconstruction of physical infrastructure and of social
cohesion (civil society) is closely linked, even contingent upon,
reconstruction in modes of governance (political institutions).
This challenge involves assessing and formulating wherever
necessary three essential conditions for the viability of the
political community: (a) the robustness of the social contract,
(b) the stability in the structure of the political process, and
(c) congruence in the dimensions of national security (i.e., the
conditions for economic, political and strategic security are set
in place) ." These considerations must be addressed early in the
reconstruction process - strengthening the argument for creation
of a reconstruction commission.
The task of reconstructing the CIS would need to address
three areas: 1) political institutions; 2) economy/physical
infrastructure; 3) and civil society, the latter being the most
complex. It is the second area (infrastructure) for which the
U.S., specifically the Corps of Engineers is particularly suited.
The U.S./ Corps could bring with it a basic accounting of
resources necessary for meeting reconstruction challenges
including (1) analytical capabilities for development of overall
49Myron Weiner, "Engineering and Planning for Rural Reconstruct'ion in
Afghanistan", A Feasibility Study Prepared by the Reconstruction Group of the
Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology;
Myron Weiner, Project Director; September 1991, pp. 4, 90.
50Nazli Choucri, "Post-War Reconstruction in the Middle East: Challenges of
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framework and designs; (2) construction and building materials;
(3) skilled and unskilled labor; (4) managerial and organizational
capabilities; (5) financial resources.
A reconstruction commission charged with addressing mega-
reconstruction efforts and activities of this magnitude would
involve international participation of the public and private
sectors. Given the scope of expected reconstruction efforts in
Eastern Europe and the CIS, these would also involve the
development of appropriate methods for cooperation and
coordination of activities - a task the Corps could not handle
without substantial reorganization, the creation of a truly
international arm' solely responsible for reconstruction/ nuclear
disarmament would be necessary.
The US does not offer these services solely out of the
goodness of its heart, however, Americans expect something back in
return which often has far reaching economic, political or
strategic implications as was the case for US involvement in the
reconstruction of Kuwait.
Chapter 5
THE CORPS' ROLE IN
RECONSTRUCTION OF KUWAIT
5.1 GENERAL: The potential reconstruction opportunities in
Kuwait were at one time thought to be enormous--of similar scale
and scope to that of Europe under the Marshall plan after WWII
(over $100 billion, 1991 dollars).
In reality, the destruction to the city was minimal when
compared to initial estimates. 51 The Iraqis paid special
attention to the infrastructure of the city, destroying control
panels and turbines at the power plants, damaging pumps at the
water pumping stations, and generally trashing schools, offices,
hospitals, police and fire stations, defense installations and
port facilities.5 2
The long hiatus in decision-making caused by the confusion
of war, compounded by the resignation of the Kuwaiti government,
left the entire world to self indulge with speculation. Much of
the industrialized world bombarded Kiwaiti officials with offers
51Initial estimates for the reconstruction of Kuwait ranged from $100 - $500
billion.
52Interview with Dr. Janet MacDonnell, USACE historian. Dr MacDonnell
documented--first hand, the Corps efforts as she was the Corps designated
historian for Operations Desert Shield/ Storm and the subsequent reconstruction
of Kuwait.
of assistance in an effort to stake a claim to its rebuilding
plan. What began as polite expressions of interest in
reconstruction turned into frantic scrambles to seal deals with
Kuwait. The prospect of a contract bonanza stirred up an
unprecedented degree of interest and direct government-to-
government campaigning on behalf of international companies.
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FIGURE 5.1.1
Satirical Cartoon
SOURCE: Chariotte Andrews. 48 Precious Moments fro' Georoe Bush's Perfect little War, Cricket Press Inc.,
1991.
The early role of US companies in securing what was
perceived as a monopoly of the emergency recovery work acted as a
spur to the international community. Many prospective
international companies challenged the US which had, through the
appointment of the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and Bechtel,
become the principle foreign partners of the Kuwait Emergency
Recovery Program (KERP).
5.2 BACKGROUND: USACE was termed "program manager" early on,
following a request by the government of Kuwait for emergency
assistance and civil reconstruction--to begin as soon as Kuwait
was freed from Iraqi occupation. On January 14, 1991, the US
Defense Department signed a $46.3 million foreign military sales
case (SEE FIGURE 5.2.1), under section 607a of the Foreign
Assistance Act, that directed the Corps of Engineers to assist in
the restoration of facilities and systems controlled by three
ministries: Public Works, Electricity, and the National Guard (the
nations police force). The initial effort was to provide
engineering and construction services during the emergency phase
of the recovery, expected to last 90 days.
Unc~iasifiied Middle East Africe., Projects Office 13 Feb 91
US Army Corps of Engirt.ra
Kuwait Recovery
Foreign Military Sales Case
$46.35 M
- $45 M for execution
- $1.35 M national overhead
Provides for 90 days of US Army Corps of Engineers response
assistance for the recovery of designated infrastructure
Desigrated infrastructure includes:
- Public buildings
- Airports
- Ports
- Electricity
- Water
- Roads
- Sanitation
- Defense facilities
FIGURE 5.2.1
SOURCE: USACE Comrmand
FOREIGN MILITARY SALES CASE
Brief, August 16, 1991
5.3 US INVOLVEMENT EARLY ON:
WHY THE CORPS? The Government of Kuwait had to choose a program
manager early on and had several obvious categories of candidates
to choose from: 1. government vs. private; 2. national
(Kuwaiti/Arab) vs. foreign. They considered what alternative
institutional arrangements were possible? A private construction
firm contracted to do public works? A non-profit quasi-public
entity designed to work with local and provincial authorities?
They questioned whether donor organizations work directly with the
proposed entity, reviewing accounts, evaluating performance, etc.
or whether an intermediary institution (e.g. and expatriate non-
government organization (NGO) would be necessary?
The team also studied other engineering organizations
engaged in rural public works, those that are predominantly
engineering organizations, and those multi-purpose NGOs combining
public works with rural development activities.
The GOK chose a foreign governmental agency e.g., the US Army
Corps of Engineers. Aside from the obvious political
ramifications, the Corps accurate assessment, and subsequent
mobilization of resources was paramount in GOK's decision to
"hire" USACE to manage their reconstruction efforts.
Several international firms were considered as potential
reconstruction program managers ("Bechtel, Brown & Root and
Parsons were considered, with Parsons winning out...until the
Corps came along with plans to mobilize quickly").5  The Corps
was involved in Operation Desert Storm and as such was involved
from the beginning. It developed a deployment schedule for
reconstruction - early on (see figures 5.3.1, 5.3.2).
53Quote from Al-Abdullah, Assistant Under Secretary, Ministry of Public
Works, Kuwait, July 1, 1991.
KERO Deployment Schedule
275 275 (Full Strength)
236
200
150
Staff
100
50
8
200 1
170
*10
K-Day * DAYS
DAYS
* K-Day * Kuwait Free & Clear
K-Day -- i'ssumed 1 Feb 91
FIGURE 5.3.1
KERO DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE
SOURCE: USACE Commanders Brief, August 16, 1991
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(ten.)
-30
Unclassiied Middle East Africa, Pro~ects Offlce 13 Feb 91
US Army Corps of Englnnrs
Kuwait Recovery
KERO Deployment
26 Jan 91 275 volunteers recruited; equipment procurement initiated
29 Jan 91 Advance party "A" (8 people) arrive in Saudi Arabia
K - 2 Advance party "B" (22 people) arrive in Saudi Arabia
K Day Advance party moves to Kuwait
K + 5 Main body completes movement into Kuwait
K + 90 Mission ends
Unclassified
FIGURE 5.3.2
SOURCE: USACE Commnand Brief,
KERO DEPLOYMENT
Augus: i-, 1991
--
The sequence of phasing of reconstruction activities was
dictated by the GOK, to a large extent, however, the Corps
(program manager) provided the contract strategy (see figure
5.3.3) for reconstruction involving necessary inputs, sequences of
resource needs and sequencing of activities, and expected
outcomes. Identifying the extent of flexibility associated with
different phases, and tasks was a major component of the overall
planning and an essential condition for effective implementation.
The recovery plan for Kuwait was mapped out early on, based on an
initial contract strategy which partitioned the country according
to levels of threat - with the main goal of assessing the damages
as soon as hostilities had ceased.
Contract Strategy
Repair/Recovery
A - $6M
B - $3M
C - $3M
Ports E,G - $3M
Ports D,F - $3 M
Hwys/Airport - $ 7 M _
Remove Ru
Marine - $ 0Q4 M Emergency
Connect/Repair Water
Total - $ 25.4 M Connect/Repair Electricity
Repair Holes in Streets
FIGURE 5.3.3
INITIAL CONTRACT STRATEGY
SOURCE: USACE Command Brief, August 16, 1991
One significant reason for the early implementation of a
contract strategy and the overwhelming success of Operation Desert
Storm was the technology used by the U.S. led coalition forces.
While most people now are familiar with such high-profile systems
as the Patriot Missile and smart bombs, they are only part of the
military technology story.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' laboratories developed
crucial technology enabling the coalition forces to exploit the
battlefield. One way the labs did this was by providing the
capability to "see" the entire battlefield. All four Corps labs
contributed to this effort: the U.S. Army Engineer Waterways
Experiment Station (WES), Vicksburg, MS; the U.S. Army
Construction Engineering Research Laboratory (CERL), Champaign,
IL; the U.S. Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory
(CRREL), Hanover, NH; and the U.S. Army Engineer Topographic
(ETL), Fort Belvoir, VA.
Engineer Topographic Laboratories (ETL)
The ability to "see" the battlefield is vital to be able to
control the action upon it. In General Schwartzkopf's famous
briefing on February 27, 1991, he emphasized the fact that
technology had enable him to "see" the entire battlefield while
Saddam Hussein could not. Much of the superior knowledge of the
battlefield was provided by technology from ETL in the form of
expedient mapping, terrain analysis, positioning and navigation,
imagery intelligence, and battlefield environment exploitation.
Much of this technology has direct application to the
reconstruction process.
U.S. Army Engineer Waterways ExDeriment Station (WES)
The Waterways Experiment Station is the largest Corps R&D
complex, with six separate laboratories. As such, WES provided a
wide spectrum of support--including explosives, dust control,
mobility modeling and evaluation, military hydrology and support
to the oil spill, to mention a few areas of support. The
following passage discuss in limited detail some of these
activities as they pertain to reconstruction.
CADD-GIS for Kuwait City--The Kuwaiti reconstruction effort
is a major undertaking. In 1983, Kuwait City contracted with a
foreign consortium for the country's first digital topographic and
utility data base using a Computer Aided Design and Drafting
(CADD) platform. WES' CADD Center was tasked to develop utility
and topographic drawings of 600 square kilometers of Kuwait City
from the existing multi-source data base.
Based on the Corps' requirements, the WES CADD Center
generated over 7,200 data files to produce 2,753 drawing files and
reduced the estimated plotting time of 200 hours by half.
U.S. Army Construction Engineering Research Laboratory (CERL)
CERL has been developing an integrated Theater Construction
Management System (TCMS). In September 1990, CERL provided
experimental software and a computer hardware platform to two
units deployed to Desert Shield. CERL delivered the following
software: Computer Aided Drafting (CAD) drawings for 2,789 Army
Facilities Component System (AFCS) facilities and installations;
commercial CAD software for adapting these drawings; commercial
construction-scheduling software for creating Critical Path Method
(CPM) networks; and a software shell developed at CERL to
integrate the individual software programs. The computer hardware
included a 33 Mhz microcomputer with a 320-megabyte hard disk, a
120-megabyte tape drive, an eight-pen plotter, and a laser
printer. These programs have been especially helpful in Kuwait.
Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory (CRREL)
Pipeline Crossing Story--Partly in the Desert Shield
planning, it became evident that if the coalition forces were to
conduct operations in Kuwait they would have to breach or cross
several petroleum pipelines. CRREL used expertise and background
gained from working on the trans-Alaska pipeline to provide
information and give perspective to the Engineer School on
crossing these large pipelines. They provided detailed
information and discussed potential problems as opposed to
providing a simple "generic" solution.
CRREL also provided background geographic data and
identified potential problem areas for selected mountainous, cold
regions within the theater. In addition the lab provided
preliminary assessments for the effectiveness of selected weapons
based on prior demonstrations and extensive research in blase
efforts. Using satellite imagery, CRREL has supported remote
sensing of the huge oil spill in the Gulf for intelligence and
control.5
This is but one example of the vast resources available to
the Corps while operating in the Gulf. Another equally important
arm of the Corps is the "Green Suiters". Those individuals who
are soldiers and often alternate their duties between Combat
Engineering and civil works - it is those folks (civil works) who
truly carried the weight during recovery operations in Kuwait.
Most of these individuals were dispersed among one of several
54David Maune, Colonel, US Army, "US Army Corps of Engineers' Laboratory
Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and to Kuwait Recovery
Operations", The Military Engineer, August 1991, p. 10.
organizations operating in the Kuwait area of operations.
5.3.a THE KUWAIT TASK FORCE (KTF): KTF, comprised of some 50 US
military civil affairs advisors, began working with a planning
group from the GOK early in December, 1990. The KTF mission was
to provide advice and technical assistance to the Kuwaitis in
several critical areas. The focus of the planning, advice, and
technical assistance was to restore basic, emergency governmental
services until the GOK regained control of the country. Included
in the services were repairing the transportation system,
providing housing, clearing garbage, reestablishing
telecommunication services and similar functions needed to provide
for the basic health and welfare of the Kuwaitis. Most of these
functions are handled by the Corps routinely, making it fairly
obvious why the Corps was chosen as program manager. The Corps
may very well be the largest "public" US construction manager,
however, I might point out that does fall under the Department of
Defense (DoD). DoD has therefore, not only been keenly interested
in the war itself but, the potential reconstruction opportunities
as well.
5.3.b DEFENSE RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE OFFICE (DRAO): DRAO was
established in April, 1991. The DRAO mission is to provide US DoD
support to the GOK for emergency restoration of civil services and
military reconstruction and recovery in the wake of the Iraqi
invasion and occupation.
DRAO's civilian and military staff act as the GOK's agent
for the reconstruction assistance provided by the US Army Corps of
Engineers' Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office (KERO) and other DoD
assistance activities in support of Kuwait's recovery.
Working under a letter of exchange signed April 5, 1991 by
the representatives of the GOK and the USA, DRAO provided planning
guidance and technical support to the various ministries of the
government. Together, DRAO and ministry leadership identified and
developed reconstruction projects to restore and/or repair civil
services.
The reconstruction assistance provided by the US to the
government and people of Kuwait is by mutual agreement and meets
the national interests of both governments.55
5.4 KUWAIT EMERGENCY RECOVERY OPERATIONS (KERO): KERO was
established as an organization within the Corps' Transatlantic
Division, an office with vast construction experience overseas in
general, and the Middle East in particular. KERO was organized as
a small Engineer District office with a headquarters and emergency
operations, project management, engineering and contracting
divisions.
The overall program for reconstruction was conceived in
terms of seven damage assessment groups (DAG): ports, airports,
fresh and waste water treatment, power production, roads, public
buildings and defense installations--each aligned with a
particular Ministry in the Kuwaiti Government (each a separate
55BG Witherspoon.
institutional activity). The DAGs were subdivided into damage
assessment teams (DAT) made up of US and Kuwaiti engineers.
These teams were augmented with contractor representatives to
conduct joint surveys of project sights. As KERO's operat-ons
matured, DAG offices were made responsible for managing the work
of contractor personnel.
The total reconstruction program is broken down into three
phases: 1) emergency phase (first 90 days after liberation); 2)
recovery phase (restoration efforts needed to get Kuwait back on
its feet - short of large scale reconstruction; and
3) reconstruction phase (remaining efforts through 5 yrs).
The Corps completed the 90 day emergency phase - with
American contractors capturing most of the work. It them moved
into the recovery phase - Americans capturing a smaller percent of
the market; and has subsequently been awarded few additional
contracts in the reconstruction phase.
5.4.a EMERGENCY PHASE (FIRST 90 DAYS AFTER LIBERATION): During
the emergency phase of the operation, Corps efforts were focused
on restoring essential services such as electricity, water
supplies and transportation corridors - sea, land and air - to
meet immediate health, safety and security needs of the country.
The recovery phase focuses on areas like schools, more permanent
repairs to public buildings and transportation networks "...the
kind of things that will help the country begin to operate more
closely to its pre-war conditions".'6
An examination of the work performed by each damage
assessment group demonstrates the accomplishments of KERO during
its first 90 days in country." This information has been
supplemented with an August '91 update -- 150 days after
liberation5" and appears in order of precedence assigned by the
GOK.
DEFENSE: Kuwaiti's defense infrastructure was heavily damaged and
in some instances destroyed as a result of the occupation and the
air and land offensive. The Defense DAG has completed the general
damage appraisals for the 19 defense installations in the country,
as well as completing detailed cost estimates on 40 key
facilities.
The Defense DAG was initially concerned with supervising
emergency repairs and renovations on Air Force hangars at the
Kuwait International Airport, a key Ministry of Defense facility
and the National Guard headquarters.
ELECTRICITY: 98% of the populated areas now draw power from the
Ministry of Electricity and Water. The first power to Kuwait City
however, was distributed over lines surveyed and repaired by KERO
56Colonel Ralph V. Locurcio, "The Corps in Kuwait: Kuwait Emergency Recovery
Office (KERO)", Enaineer Officer Bulletin, US Army, July 1991, NO.13, pp. 16.
57James N. Parker Jr., "Kuwait Effort Moves Into Recovery Phase",
Transatlantic News, Vol.6, No.5, May 1991, pp. 1.
58Fact Sheet on the Reconstruction of Kuwait: 150 Days After Liberation,
Embassy of the USA, State of Kuwait, 1AUG91.
and its contractors. The three lines running from the Doha power
station to Omeriya, a distance of 23 kilometers, were the first
lines repaired after the liberation of Kuwait. In addition KERO
contractors have repaired 40 km of power transmission lines from
Al-Zour power station to the Shuaiba substation, completed
emergency repairs to a major substation on 6th Ring Road, restored
power to the airport and completed 64 damage surveys.
Corps contractors have begun work on four additional
transmission lines and are repairing the Fintas "W" substation.
To date 8,635 km (5,400 miles) of transmission lines have been
replaced and the Doha East, Doha West, and Al Zour power plants
all provide adequate (surplus) power.
WATER & SANITATION: Three desalinization plants are operating,
with the two billion gallon reservoir nearly full to capacity.
Team members in the Water DAG have supervised repairs to six major
breaks in the Al Zour to Mina Abdulla pipeline and the conversion
of three brackish water lines to fresh water in order to increase
the flow to the West Finatees reservoir. Additionally, they have
completed 28 damage assessments. The Ministry of Electricity and
Water has assumed total responsibility for continued repairs and
maintenance.
Present efforts are focused on three areas: assessment and
repair of the pressurized network; repair of water lines to Ras Al
Qualaya naval base; and temporary repairs to the Mina Abdulla pump
station.
Personnel in the Sanitary DAG have completed 27 damage
surveys on 77 different facilities. Contractors have repaired six
breaks in the sanitary sewer system lines. After KERO completes a
detailed system analysis, remaining work on the sanitary system
will be completed by the Government of Kuwait.
ROADS: Corps contractors repaired 12 kilometers of Nuaisib Road,
the major artery into Kuwait from Saudi Arabia. Iraqi forces had
trenched and destroyed the roadway as a deterrent to an allied
ground offensive. More then 70% of the bomb craters on major
roadways have been repaired and contractors have removed 2,800
wrecked vehicles, 584 "Jersey" barriers and 258 Iraqi defensive
bunkers from over 200 kilometers of highway. At present the KERO
Roads DAG is supervising repairs to Al Salmi motorwDy, Kuwait's
other north/south artery, and planning for repairs to the Al
Abdaly road is in progress.
AIRPORT: The Airport DAG has completed 22 damage assessments at
Kuwait International Airport. The KERO team has supervised
emergency repairs to the reception area at the airport and the
Corps contractors have completed initial emergency repairs to the
main terminal, allowing passenger traffic, customs operations and
baggage handling operations to resume. More than 463
obstructions, ranging from large shipping containers to war
damaged vehicles have been removed from runways and taxiways.
Additional repairs to the terminal are underway and design
work is continuing on the renovation or reconstruction of several
key facilities, including hangars, cargo building, training
building, and additional terminal security and departure gates.
Contractors are repairing damages to one of the two runways and
some of the apron area near several passenger gates caused by
bombing. The International Airport resumed 24-hour operations on
August 1 with five operational gates at the main terminal. Six
additional gates will open by the end of September, 1991.
PORTS: Al-Shuaiba Port is open to commerce after a Corps contract
provided for a marine side scan sonar survey of the harbor and
entrance channel.
In addition to the marine survey, Port DAG team members also
have completed damage surveys to land side facilities at Al
Shuaiba and AL-Shuwaikh. The GOK will contract for the repair and
restoration of port facilities.
PUBLIC BUILDINGS: The Public Buildings DAG has completed 450
damage assessments on public buildings in the following sectors:
Health, food distribution, security, fire department, public
housing, communications, public transportation, and schools.
Emergency repairs are completed on 70 government buildings now in
use by the Government of Kuwait (GOK).
A critical program in the eyes of the government was the
reopening of the public school system by the beginning of the
school year. To do that, more than 300 schools had to be
surveyed, cleaned, and repaired. KERO engineers completed these
assessments. Damages varied, although 70% of the schools appeared
to have sustained light damage. Of particular significance was
the stolen laboratory equipment, five tons of books (over 700,000
volumes), and the University's mainframe computer--all missing and
needing to be replaced.
The Parliament (National Assembly) Building and the Kuwait
Museum are undergoing extensive repairs from heavy artillery
damage and fire bombing by Iraqi forces. Permanent renovations
are expected to be completed by April 92.
For state buildings, the Corps completed emergency repairs
and clean up of two sections of the Bayan Complex, totaling $1.5
million. Eight damage assessments were completed for state
buildings, including the Seif Complex. The GOK has assumed
responsibility for managing the renovation of state
buildings.
It became increasingly apparent that communication with each
of these separate instillation activities was critical to the
overall program for reconstruction. As program manager, the Corps
acted as the hub, providing a basic accounting of resources and
allocating resources necessary for meeting reconstruction
challenges.
The Corps made great strides during this phase of the
operation - where it operated autonomously. It is here where the
Corps vast organizational skills and standard operating procedures
for emergency operations played a key role.
5.4.b RECOVERY PHASE: The Corps began to loose ground after the
initial 90 day emergency phase. Problems began to arise: The
GOK, for instance, made deals for emergency repairs and
rehabilitation work on its own, notably the ministries of health,
electricity and water--with no coordination with to the Corps."5
Many international companies saw fit to bypass the Corps,
dealing directly with the ministries. This was a major source of
several problems as you might expect. There were several examples
of the very same work being let by both the Corps and a particular
ministry to two entirely different contractors."6 Additionally,
the contracts themselves were sloppy. In an effort to expedite
work, pre-qualification rules, bid procedures and bond
requirements were not beiing followed. This was to be the
beginning of a great loss for the Corps.
5.4.c RECONSTRUCTION PHASE: The Corps lost in a big way when it
comes to the reconstruction phase. It received some negative
press as program manager and had visibly lost ground in the
overall scheme of things, including a much smaller piece of the
reconstruction pie. When asked about the Corps future as program
manager, Bader Al-Qabandi, the number two man on the Kuwaiti
reconstruction team suggested "it's anyone's guess". The only
reason the Corps was named was because "it would take a long time
to settle with a private company, and because of the urgency of
the war." ,,61
The Corps was to handle emergency and long-term restoration
of all 18 military installations--including two air force bases,
""Special Report - Kuwait", Meed, 17 MAY, 1991, pp. XXII.
"Personal interview with Captain Dan Encines, USACE project officer,
Kuwait, 26 AUG, 1991.
61
"Kuwaitis Rethinking Management Plans", Engineering News Record, July 1/8,
1991, pp. 30.
three army bases, and one navy base--plus the headquarters
buildings for the ministry of defense. Now, the Kuwaitis are back
peddling. The Corps prefers to call it "a rethinking." The
Kuwaitis say they want to handle more of the military
reconstruction themselves, kicking a hole in the program that
could encompass two-thirds of the work the Corps was counting on.
The Corps has been relegated to rebuilding only the two air bases
at a cost of about $150 million each.62
The US share of the Kuwaiti reconstruction effort will be at
least 35% over a five year period.6 ' This is much smaller than
the 70% share the US received in emergency clean-up work. But 35%
is still substantially greater than the 15% of the market share
the US had of Kuwaiti business prior to the invasion -
substantially less work than thought.
Al-Abdullah (the powerful assistant under secretary in the
ministry of public works) believes that the Corps rates only fair
marks as the manager of the reconstruction. The building is "not
as organized" as he would like, he says. He pushed for a private
management company instead. Bechtel, Brown & Root and Parsons
were considered, but the Corps came along with plans to mobilize
quickly. Al-Abdullah fought his countrymen but claims "too many
fingers got in the pot and spoiled it.""6
62Ibid. pp. 26.
63Jean AbiNader, President of the National US-Arab Chamber of Commerce, Gulf
Reconstruction Report, APR 10, 1991, pp. 11.
64Ibid., pp. 28.
5.5 SUMMARY: The magnitude of problems and business opportunities
in Kuwait had too many people expecting too much, too soon in
rewards. Reconstruction of Kuwait alone has not and will not turn
around the economic recession in the US, and not even the downturn
in the construction industry. There is considerably less
structural damage to the infrastructure than expected and
therefore, it is unlikely that there will be much need for large-
scale civil works contracts for rebuilding. The core
infrastructure remains mostly intact, in need of repair and
refurbishment but not replacement.
Early alarm, verging on the hysterical, that the US would
make a clean sweep of reconstruction work, was clearly misplaced.
Work awarded under the 90 day recovery program did go mostly to US
main contractors but the majority of follow-on contracts did not.
The Corps "short list"65 lost its seemingly magical significance,
once it was released that the Corps wasn't the only avenue of
approach for rebuilding work.
In the end run, the Corps failed to secure a large portion
of the work. It failed in its task to create an effective
organization which could work with local authorities to carry out
reconstruction and development activities, whose activities could
be effectively monitored by donor agencies, and which had the
standing to warrant support from a variety of bilateral and
multilateral donors. This task was made unusually difficult by
65
"short list" - list of companies that pre-qualified with USACE for work
in the emergency phase.
the special political circumstances under which such an entity
must function.
5.5.a POLITICAL CLIMATE IN KUWAIT: Before the war, most Kuwaitis
led a pampered life in an explosive region. More than 90 percent
worked for the government, holding down a desk and a chair at one
of the ministries. Health care was free, newlyweds were given a
house. Oil paid for an expatriate work fcrce to keep things
running; it imported the amenities, and those in position took a
nice commission on the deal.
The lifestyle contributed to an attitude of indifference
that outsiders interpreted - accurately - as arrogance. It cost
the Kuwaitis some bad press in a crisis in which they were the
victims. Now the Kuwaitis are challenging each other to reshape
their society and government.
Almost exclusively, the business of Kuwait is oil and it is
government-owned." Tenders for foreign equipment and services
are put out by the Kuwait Oil Co., and the bids and related
approvals work their way tortuously through the bureaucracy. A
particular problem for private business is the government policy
on work visas. Officials insist they want to cut the foreign
labor force, but businessmen say they can round up the necessary
visas - it just takes a little longer.
Business as usual reigns in this desert sheikdom a year
66Today, Kuwait is classified as the fourth largest oil-producing country
in the world. The oil bonanza, apart from consolidating the political power of
the state - and that of its ruling family - has also given the state considerable
economic power. This is evident from the international participation in the Gulf
War.
after Saddam Hussein's Iraqi legions were repulsed. In these
months of reflection and restoration, many influential Kuwaitis
appear unable to look beyond the trauma of the occupation and its
ugly aftermath of vigilantism. Western diplomats say the abuses
against alleged collaborators have largely been brought under
control by Kuwaiti security.
Palestinians who left by the tens of thousands during the
occupation have been denied re-entry, and others are being forced
out as their work permits here expire. Bedouins - Kuwait's so-
called stateless Arabs - also face continued discrimination. Some
bedouins of Iraqi ancestry went north during the occupation and
now are stranded in the demilitarized zone separating Kuwait and
Iraq. Kuwaiti authorities refuse to accept them, suggesting that
they could comprise an Iraqi fifth column. Little over a year
ago, Kuwait depended on bedouins for security: They made up the
majority of the army's enlisted ranks.
Meanwhile, according to Western businessmen and diplomats,
Kuwaiti officials' main interest appears to be not so much getting
the best value for the dinar but spending the fewest possible
dinars - a time-consuming bidding process. "We're right back to
the same old system," an American businessman agreed, questioning
the professionalism and efficiency of the government, with or
without foreign managers. "You make a bid, it goes to the
ministry, and the man just sits there and waits. Waits for
better offer, waits for another bid, waits for word from the old
personal representatives (the fixer).
Demands for political change are rampant even today,
particularly among the Kuwaitis who remained there during the
occupation. All in all this presented an impossible political
situation - the Corps could not adequately deal with.
Chapter 6
CONCLUSION/ RECOMMENDATIONS
We have moved from a bipolar to a unipolar universe with
Soviet Union's collapse and the assertion of US military dominance
in Kuwait. The US alone now occupies the central position and
with that comes responsibilities to the International community.
The U.S. will most surely get involved with reconstruction/
disaster relief efforts in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Republics. Recalling from history, the U.S. understood that war-
torn Europe stood on the brink of collapse, perhaps revolution
after WWII. The challenge for the Truman administration, at that
time, was to make Americans realize that it was in their long-term
interest to come to the rescue.
A half century later, George Bush faces similar problems.
By having Secretary of State Baker call at Princeton for an
international conference on Soviet aid, Bush was borrowing another
page from the Truman playbook. The plan to aid Europe was
announced in 1947 not by the president but by Secretary of State
George C. Marshall (hence the Marshall Plan).
The big difference between then and now, of course, is that
in 1947 the United States was by far the richest nation in the
world, and today it feels comparatively broke. The Marshall Plan
cost more than $100 billion in 1991 dollars. The Bush
administration is suggesting a paltry $600 million to help the
Soviets.
In the case of aid to developing nations to combat
overpopulation, declining resources, underemployment, hunger and
poverty, the US contribution ranks 18th among the 24 leading
industrialized nations in relation to size of its economy. At
0.18 percent of GNP, the US is far below the target of 0.7 percent
long ago agreed upon by all UN member states. Moreover the vast
majority of US economic assistance is concentrated on just four
strategic allies, 67 two of them from the Middle East."6 Perhaps
it is opportune for the US to change its current practices,
shifting more to the new global environment.
Handing out the aid will be a monumental task. It is still
far from clear who is in charge throughout the various republics.
Despite a poor harvest, the Soviets probably have enough food, but
they lack a way to distribute it. Farmers horde their produce,
awaiting price liberation. Roads and railways in the Soviet Union
are in wretched shape. It is entirely possible that the West will
have to create its own distribution network, probably by using the
military. Before the winter is out, the world could be treated to
the strange spectacle of NATO convoys penetrating deep into their
old enemy on a mission of mercy.69
67Israel, Egypt, Pakistan and El Salvador.
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Just who will do this work is uncertain, but one thing is
for sure: the US Army Corps of Engineers is already tasked with
performing diplomatic duties in emergency operations and military
construction for friendly foreign nations. The Corps is an agent
of our government and our national policy. It has its finger on
the pulse of national sentiment and our policy-makers' desires.
Hopefully, our nation's civilian leadership recognizes the
correlation between this and the emerging opportunities to employ
the Corps in the international arena.
The Corps has displayed the flexibility needed to manage
crises and correct deficiencies before they become critical. It
has also displayed a willingness to take risks and the skill to
make most of them pay off. This is evident by virtue of its
successful completion of over $18 billion in construction projects
in the Middle East. I reviewed the history of the Corps of
Engineers, its organizational structure and foreign mandate, and
reviewed its historical experience in the Middle East. The Corps
is particularly suited for this new role. The scale and scope of
the Corps' present operations in Kuwait and Egypt, coupled with
its past operations in Saudi Arabia are excellent examples of how
an engineering/construction manager combines planning,
organization, staffing and control to complete international
construction projects. Additionally, the historic role the U.S.,
particularly the military, has played in post-war reconstruction
and emergency operations in the international arena is
substantial. If we recognize lessons learned from previous
experiences in reconstruction, particularly Kuwait, they could be
applied to the Eastern European and Soviet markets.
The Corps should sit as a member of a reconstruction
commission charged with addressing mega-reconstruction efforts and
activities involving international participation of the public and
private sectors. Given the scope of expected reconstruction
efforts in Eastern Europe and the CIS, these would also involve
the development of appropriate methods for cooperation and
coordination of activities - a task the Corps could not handle in
either Korea or Kuwait. The creation of a truly international
arm' solely responsible for reconstruction/ nuclear disarmament
would be necessary.
If we do employ the Corps in post cold-war Europe and the
"Soviet Union" as the U.S. agent for reconstruction, I believe
that our technology and construction contractor bases would be
strengthened, bolstering our Nation's competitiveness in this
burgeoning global market sector simultaneously, while we help our
neighbors.
The U.S. and the Corps benefit as well:
1) International work helps to hone and maintain the Corps'
construction management skills.
2) The Corps of engineers can be used to cement ties
between nations which become strategically important to the US.
3) A pressing political consideration involves opportunity
to provide work for US architect/engineers, suppliers and
construction contractors abroad.
I believe the Corps has applied these tenants to the Middle
East region in general, thereby leveraging itself at home and
abroad, and has had tremendous success. We must recognize
however, that the case of Saudi Arabia was unique - in that there
were few players and ample resources to pay for construction
projects. The Corps could do the same in the new, emerging market
but would have to reorganize to do so - a more substantial
reorganization than was done for Saudi Arabia70 and Kuwait.
Although the fiscal situation may be somewhat different in
E.Europe, there is certainly a need to build a construction
industry base--a task the Corps is up to. This could be done on
some sort of a credit basis whereby, the US provides dollar
credits to respective countries who in-turn "hire" the Corps to
manage the reconstruction program. The Corps subsequently lets
the contracts to qualified US firms--thereby bolstering the US
economy while simultaneously rebuilding our neighbors.
Unless wisely invested, the inheritance from our cold-war
victory and subsequent Gulf War victory will soon be exhausted and
we will find ourselves in hock as never before. This is more
easily recognized when viewed against the worldwide triumph of
corporate capitalism. Three giant mergers in fierce competition
with one another may effectively rule not just individual nations
but whole clusters of allied economics - American, Inc., Europe,
Inc., and Japan, Inc. Hence, the world may be neither bipolar nor
unipolar but tripolar.
70The rapid growth of the entire Saudi Arabian program, caused USACE to
create a new Division office in 1976, which was the equivalent of having a
separate operating company in a private engineering and construction firm.
We should see ourselves as stewards of the planet, whose
task is to sustain ourselves and help rebuild our neighbors,
simultaneously. The U.S. has a distinct responsibility and the
Corps of Engineers a unique aptitude to lead these efforts in
Europe and the CIS. This opportunity will not last forever, we
must therefore, act now and form a national strategy to utilize
the Corps as our reconstruction agent in this new international
marketplace.
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